FROM *BID^cA* TO *SUNNA*: THE *WILĀYA* OF ^cALĪ IN THE SHĪ^cĪ *ADHĀN*

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Although the *wilāya* of ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib—the attestation of his spiritual and temporal authority—has always been professed by the Shī^ca and has appeared in their ritual and other practices (such as coinage) in various forms, its inclusion in the *adhān* (call to prayer) was once generally rejected by Shī^cī scholars. It is now, however, a distinctive feature of the *adhān* in use among the Twelver Shī^ca. This paper traces and explains how this change came about and how it was eventually justified by the leading scholarly authorities of the community, especially from the Safavid era and later.

A DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF THE *adhān* (call to prayer) as recited by Twelver Shī^cīs is the inclusion of the *wilāya* (spiritual and temporal authority) of ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Thus, after reciting the *shahāda* (bearing witness to the unity of one God and the prophecy of Muḥammad) the *mu^ɔadhdhin* (caller to prayer) will normally state "*Ashhadu anna ^cAliyyan waliyu^ɔllāh*" (I bear witness that ^cAlī is the friend of God). In the minds of many Twelver Shī^cīs, this popular practice has become an important component of the *adhān*. However, the *wilāya* was not recited in the *adhān* at the time of the Prophet or during the lives of any of the Shī^cī imams.[1] In this paper, I trace its provenance and evolution. Initially, I examine the pronouncements of early Shī^cī jurists on this issue and compare and contrast their views with the verdicts of later authors. The judgment of the later jurists, moreover, contrasts starkly with the rulings of their predecessors. A need to assert and propagate the Shī^cī identity in terms of a nascent political state led eventually to the inclusion of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. At that point the Shī^cī jurists resorted to various forms of hermeneutics to vindicate such a practice.

The earliest Shī^cī juridical work extant is al-Kulaynī's (d. 329/941) *Furū^c al-kāfī*. Although in this work al-Kulaynī examines various segments of the *adhān*, he does not discuss or even mention the *wilāya* of ^cAlī as a part of it at all.[2] The first scholar to take up the *wilāya* in the *adhān* was al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991). After reviewing the different parts of the *adhān* in his *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh*, he states:

> This is the correct *adhān*; nothing is to be added or subtracted from it. The Mufawwiḍa,[3] may God curse them, have fabricated traditions and have added to the *adhān* "Muḥammad and the family of Muḥammad are the best of mankind," [reciting it] twice. In some of their traditions, after uttering "I bear witness that Muḥammad is the Prophet of Allāh," [they add] "I bear witness that ^cAlī is the *walī* (friend) of God" twice. Among them there are others who narrate instead of this "I bear witness that ^cAlī is the true Commander of the Faithful" twice. There is no doubt that ^cAlī is the friend of God and that he is the true

[1] The Shī^cī *adhān* is also distinguished from its Sunnī counterpart by the inclusion of "*ḥayya ^calā khayri'l-^camal*" (hasten to the best of deeds), but a discussion of the genesis of this practice is beyond the scope of this paper.

[2] Muḥammad b. Ya^cqūb al-Kulaynī, *Furū^c al-kāfī*, 6 vols. (Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, 1391/1971), 3: 302.

[3] The term Mufawwiḍa refers to those who espoused the doctrine of *tafwīḍ* (delegation), i.e., the belief that after creation, God delegated His powers over all matters pertaining to creation, provision for His creatures, and worldly affairs to the Prophet and the imams. That this belief had permeated the Shī^cī ranks can be discerned from several traditions in Shī^cī *ḥadīth* literature. See Kulaynī, *Uṣūl al-kāfī*, 4 vols. (Tehran, n.d.), 2: 2–5, and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār, *Baṣā^ɔir al-darajāt fī faḍā^ɔil Āl Muḥammad* (Qum: Maktaba Ayatullāh al-Mar^cashi al-Najafi, 1404/1983), 378–79, where several traditions justify the belief in *tafwīḍ*. Subsequent Shī^cī theologians distanced themselves from this doctrine. See al-Ṣadūq, *Risālat al-i^ctiqādāt* (A Shī^cite Creed), tr. A. Fyzee (Calcutta: Oxford Univ. Press, 1361/1942), 100–101; Mufīd, *Awā'il al-maqālāt* (Qum: Maktaba al-Dawari, 1370/1950), 240–41. The origins and doctrines of the Mufawwiḍa are also discussed by H. Modarressi, *Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shī^cite Islam* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1993), ch. 2.

> Commander of the Faithful and that Muḥammad and his family, peace be upon them, are the best of [God's] creatures. However, that is not [part] of the original *adhān*. I have mentioned this so that those who have been accused of concocting [the doctrine of] *tafwīḍ* and have insinuated themselves in our ranks should become known.[4]

It is clear that al-Ṣadūq regards those reciting the *wilāya* as belonging to the Mufawwiḍa, which is, for him, an extremist group, as he unequivocally curses and condemns them for their actions. For al-Ṣadūq, the recitation of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* is one of the distinguishing marks of the Mufawwiḍa. Thus the Mufawwiḍa are to be differentiated from the mainstream Twelver Shīᶜīs by this practice.

Many tenth- and eleventh-century jurists did not consider it important to discuss the issue of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. Thus, where and when the *adhān* is discussed in some detail, there is no mention of the *wilāya*, as, for example, in al-Mufīd's (d. 413/1022) *Muqniᶜa*,[5] or in the *Intiṣār* of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044).[6] In his *Tahdhīb*, Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) refers to various *ḥadīth*s reporting different juridical rulings, but in spite of this, he cites not a single *ḥadīth* indicating the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī in the *adhān*. This is surprising in view of the fact that, in his other works (to be discussed presently), Ṭūsī admits that odd and isolated (*shādhdh*) reports concerning the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī in the *adhān* have been related.[7] But, in all probability, the traditions about the *wilāya* were not available to him.[8] Alternatively, because these reports were rare, Ṭūsī did not deem them veracious and worthy of consideration.[9] In his *Nihāya*, Ṭūsī even states that one who utters the *wilāya* is in error (*mukhṭiʾ*).[10] However, in his *Mabsūṭ*, he says simply:

> As for uttering "ᶜAlī is the Commander of the Faithful and the family of Muḥammad is the best of mankind" in accord with what has been narrated in isolated reports, this is not to be acted upon [*fa-laysa bi maᶜmūl ᶜalayhi*] in the *adhān*. But, if a person recites it, he does not commit a sin for that reason (*lam yaʾtham bihi*). However, it is not amongst the *faḍīla* (recommended parts) of the *adhān* nor does it [the *wilāya*] make it [the *adhān*] more complete.[11]

The foregoing evidence reveals fairly clearly that scholars such as al-Ṣadūq and Ṭūsī prohibited including the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. It is to be remembered also that these scholars were living under the aegis of Buyid rulers (334–447/945–1055) who were favorably disposed towards the Shīᶜīs. Thus, although they were neither politically oppressed nor constrained in their writings, Shīᶜī jurists of the tenth and eleventh centuries either prohibited outright or strongly discouraged the utterance of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. There is no evidence to suggest, moreover, that their ruling on this issue was based on *taqiyya* (dissimulation).

THE ILKHĀNID EPOCH IN SHĪᶜĪ JURISPRUDENCE

After the destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols in 656/1258, the center of Shīᶜī studies moved from Baghdad to Ḥilla. Due mainly to the presence of the Shīᶜī philosopher and theologian Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), an influential counselor to the Mongol king Hulegu, Ḥilla was spared Mongol destruction. Therefore, during the Ilkhānid era (656–754/1258–1353), the Shīᶜī *ᶜulamāʾ* continued to enjoy good relations with the ruler. As an example, ᶜAllāma Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) and his son were often invited to the court of Öljeitū (d. 712/1316).[12] Reportedly, he was a witness to the Sultan's conversion to Twelver Shīᶜīsm.[13] But, again, despite the period of relative peace

[4] Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī ibn Babawayh al-Ṣadūq, *Man lā yaḥduruhu al-faqīh*, 4 vols. (Qum: Imam al-Mahdi, 1404/1983), 1: 188.

[5] Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Nuᶜmān al-Mufīd, *al-Muqniᶜa*, 2nd ed. (Qum: Mu'assas al-Nashr al-Islami, 1411/1990), 100.

[6] ᶜAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, *al-Intiṣār* (Najaf: Manshurat al-Haydariyya, 1391/1971), 39.

[7] He does not cite these in his *al-Khilāf* either. See Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ṭūsī, *Kitāb al-khilāf*, 3 vols. (Qum: Maktaba Ismaᶜiliyan, n.d.), 1: 83.

[8] There is no trace of the *wilāya* traditions in any of the extant Shīᶜī juridical manuals. They are only casually referred to by early authors like al-Ṣadūq and Ṭūsī.

[9] The same can also be stated for the absence of *wilāya* traditions in his *al-Istibsār*. See Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ṭūsī, *al-Istibsār fī mā ikhtalafa min al-akhbār*, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Adwa', 1406/1985), 1: 299, 305.

[10] Ṭūsī, *al-Nihāya fī mujarrad al-fiqh wa'l-fatāwā* (Qum: Quds Muḥammadi, n.d.), 69.

[11] Ṭūsī, *al-Mabsūṭ fī fiqh al-Imāmiyya*, 8 vols. (Tehran: al-Matbaᶜa al-Haydariyya, 1387/1967), 1: 99.

[12] Said Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and Societal Change in Shīᶜite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986), 29. See also p. 58 for other examples of the cordial relations between the Shīᶜī jurists and the Ilkhānid kings.

[13] S. H. M. Jafrī, "al-Ḥillī," in *EI*².

between Shīʿī and Sunnī communities, there was no change in the stance of Shīʿī scholars on the question of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*.

Although the juridical works of scholars in that period, such as Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Idrīs (d. 598/1201), contain detailed discussions of the *adhān* and *iqāma*,[14] the question of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* is never even alluded to. It is to be further noted that although Ibn Idrīs appends a separate section on the recommended parts (*faḍāʾil*) of the *adhān*, contrary to the practice of later scholars, he does not mention the *wilāya* in this section either.[15]

Other scholars of Ḥilla were more explicit in their rejection of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. After enumerating segments of the *adhān* in his *Muʿtabar*, Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 676/1277) declares: "Anything added to this is *bidʿa*."[16] His contemporary al-Hadhalī (d. 690/1291) states in his *al-Jāmiʿ li'l-sharāʾiʿ* that, although the *wilāya* has been narrated in rare traditions, it is not to be practiced as a part of the *adhān*.[17]

Although they were living under favorable political conditions, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century jurists concurred with their predecessors on the issue. Thus the aforementioned ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī explicitly forbids the recitation of the *wilāya* in his *Nihāyat al-aḥkām*, stating that it is not permissible to recite it since there was no ruling for it in the *sharīʿa* (*li-ʿadami mashrūʿiyyatihi*).[18]

Fourteenth-century Shīʿī scholars based in Jabal ʿĀmil followed the example of their predecessors in prohibiting the utterance of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. In his *al-Lumʿa al-dimashqiyya*, Muḥammad b. Jamāl al-Dīn (d. 786/1384), also called Shahīd al-Awwal (Shahīd I), definitively forbids the utterance of the *wilāya*, even though, he admits, it is in fact a reality (*wa in kāna al-wāqiʿ kadhālik*).[19] In his *al-Durūs*, Shahīd I further adds that the *wilāya* is a credal issue, and is not a part of the *adhān*.[20] He repeats al-Ṣadūq's proscription, saying that the *wilāya* in the *adhān* is a concoction of the Mufawwiḍa. As a matter of fact, Shahīd I is consistent in prohibiting the recitation of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* in all four of his major juridical works (*al-Lumʿa*, *al-Dhikrā*, *al-Bayān*, and *al-Durūs*).

The trend amongst the early jurists of either prohibiting or discouraging the pronunciation of the *wilāya* is confirmed by another scholar of Jabal ʿĀmil, Zayn al-Dīn b. ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Shāmī (Shahīd II) (d. 966/1558). In his *Rawḍa al-jinān* he unequivocally affirms that the insertion of the *wilāya* or anything of that nature in the *adhān* is *bidʿa* (innovation) and that the reports about it have been fabricated. The issue at stake, Shahīd II reminds us, is not whether they (the family of the Prophet) are the best of creatures or not. Rather, the question is whether the *wilāya* can be inserted in an act of worship which has been itself divinely ordained. Not every correct article of belief is worthy of insertion in the acts of worship (*ʿibādāt*) that have been legislated by the Lawgiver.[21] In his *al-Masālik*, Shahīd II maintains further that it is forbidden (*ḥarām*) to add anything to the *adhān*.[22]

In his commentary (*sharḥ*) on the *Lumʿa*, the same Shahīd II maintains that the *wilāya* pertains to a matter of belief. It is not to be counted a part of the *adhān*. He restates his previous assertion that inserting the *wilāya* in the *adhān* is tantamount to *bidʿa*. It is as if one were to

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[14] The *iqāma* is the second call to prayer which is pronounced before each of the prescribed daily prayers. On the differences between the *adhān* and *iqāma*, see T. Juynboll, "Ikāma," in *EI*².

[15] See ʿAlī Asghar al-Mawārid, *Silsila al-yanābiʿ al-fiqhiyya*, 25 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Turath/al-Dar al-Islamiyya, 1410/1990), 4: 660—citing Ibn Idrīs, *al-Sarā'ir*. In an article on the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, Riḍa Ustādī examines the rulings on the *wilāya* by diverse Shīʿī jurists from the time of al-Ṣadūq to the present. I am indebted to Sayyid Muḥammad Rizvi of Toronto for providing me with a copy if this article. Although quite useful for the purposes of this study, Ustādī's article, which has the title "*Kalimāt al-aʿlām ḥawl jawāz al-shahāda bi'l-wilāya*," bears no indication of where or when it was published and despite some effort, I have not been able to locate its source.

[16] *Bidʿa* refers to an innovation, whether in belief or practice, for which no precedent was set at the time of the Prophet. Later, to accommodate changing circumstances, a distinction was made between good (hence acceptable) and bad *bidʿa*. See J. Robson, "Bidʿa," in *EI*².

[17] As cited in al-Mawārid, *Silsila*, 4: 867.

[18] al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. ʿAlī al-Ḥillī, *Nihāya al-aḥkām fī maʿrifa al-aḥkām*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Qum: Mu'assa Ismaʿiliyan, 1410/1990), 1: 412. Al-Ḥillī also prohibits the recitation of the *wilāya* in his *al-Muntaha* and *al-Tadhkira*. See Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 384–85. There is no mention of the *wilāya* in al-Ḥillī's *Sharāʾiʿī*. See *Sharāʾiʿī al-Islam fī masā'il al-ḥalāl wa'l-ḥarām*, 4 vols. (Najaf: al-Adab, 1389/1969), 1: 75–76.

[19] Muḥammad b. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Makkī al-ʿĀmilī, *al-Lumʿa al-dimashqiyya*, 2nd ed., 10 vols. (Isfahan: Maktaba al-Imam Amir al-Mu'minin, 1398/1977), 1: 573.

[20] As cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 385.

[21] Shahīd II, *Rawḍa al-jinān fī sharḥ irshād al-adhhān* (n.p., 1886), 1: 242.

[22] As cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 385.

add a *rak^c^a* (unit of prayer) or the *tashahhud* (the *shahāda*) in the prayer.[23]

Mulla Aḥmad al-Ardabīlī (d. 993/1585) (also called Muqaddas) initially quotes al-Ṣadūq's proscription against reciting the *wilāya* and agrees with him. Al-Ardabīlī further states that pronouncing the *wilāya* is tantamount to following the precedence set by ^c^Umar, who had altered the *adhān* that is recited in the morning by inserting the *tathwīb* ("prayer is better than sleep"). Since the Shī^c^īs condemn ^c^Umar for adding an extraneous element to the *adhān*, it is improper for them to emulate such an act.[24] It is to be noted, however, that al-Ardabīlī permits the sending of blessings (*ṣalawāt*) on the Prophet and his family when his name is mentioned in the *adhān*. This, explains al-Ardabīlī, is because of the narration of general traditions (*^c^umūm al-akhbār*) recommending this act. Significantly, he does not cite here the tradition from Ṭabarsī's (d. 588/1192) *al-Iḥtijāj* which, as we shall see, was used by later jurists to argue in favor of pronouncing the *wilāya* in the *adhān*.

The preceding discussion indicates that there was a clear consensus reached by the early Shī^c^ī jurists on either prohibiting or discouraging the utterance of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. Those reciting the *wilāya* were marginalized and seen by jurists such as al-Ṣadūq, ^c^Allāma al-Ḥillī and al-Ardabīlī as extremists. No jurist in the pre-Safavid era, whether living in Baghdad, Ḥilla, or Jabal ^c^Āmil, encouraged the practice. Indeed, no Shī^c^ī jurist even stated that, provided it was not intended to be a part of the *adhān*, the *wilāya* may be recited—a distinction that was to be drawn by subsequent jurists. In all probability, the reason why the pre-Safavid jurists prohibited the recitation of the *wilāya* was that, living with the vicissitudes of the Sunnī milieu, they wanted to distance themselves from all practices linked to the extremists. This observation can be corroborated from the fact that, in prohibiting the *wilāya*, they often quoted al-Ṣadūq's statement attributing this practice to the Mufawwiḍa. Furthermore, the jurists did not sanction the practice and they did not consider *ḥadīth* reports about it to be trustworthy. But, given the overall prohibition against reciting the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, when then did the practice begin among the general Shī^c^ī populace? How was it to be vindicated? It is to these questions that I now turn.

[23] See Shahīd II, *Sharḥ al-lum^c^a*, 1: 573.

[24] al-Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī, *Majma^c^ al-fā'ida wa'l burhān fī sharḥ irshād al-adhhān* (Qum: Jami'a al-Mudarrisin, 1403/1982), 2: 181.

THE *WILĀYA* IN THE *ADHĀN* IN THE SAFAVID ERA (907–1201/1501–1786)

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the gradual establishment and eventual triumph of Shī^c^īsm under the Safavid rulers of Iran. As Scarcia-Amoretti has shown, even before the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, the atmosphere of relative religious eclecticism in Iran had engendered a devotion to ^c^Alī, in particular, and to the household of the Prophet, in general.[25] In 907/1501, Shāh Ismā^c^īl (d. 930/1524), the first Safavid ruler, used this prevailing pro-^c^Alī sentiment to declare Twelver Shī^c^īsm the official religion of the state.[26] The replacement of Sunnīsm by Shī^c^īsm required a rigorous policy of religious conversion that would help transform Shī^c^ism from a sectarian into a national religion. Propagation of the Shī^c^ī faith also necessitated the imposition of measures that would enhance doctrinal and liturgical uniformity. Thus Shāh Ismā^c^īl sought different ways to encourage public expression of Islam in a Shī^c^i form. He had the names of the twelve imams mentioned in the sermons and issued a commandment stating that the first three caliphs were to be publicly cursed. Whoever refused to do so was to be killed.[27] He also issued a decree stating that the *wilāya* was to be mentioned in the *adhān*.[28] It was therefore only in this era that the *wilāya* in the *adhān* was first promulgated and practiced at the popular level with official sanction. The insertion of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* was thus deeply intertwined with the Safavid rulers' attempts at implanting a deeper commitment to Shī^c^īsm amongst the Iranian masses.

It is to be remembered that before the advent of the Safavids, Shī^c^īsm was largely nonexistent in Iran.[29] But,

[25] Said Arjomand, *The Shadow of God*, 106.

[26] Various reasons have been offered for the imposition of Shī^c^īsm as the state religion. According to Lambton, the Safavids chose Shī^c^īsm to differentiate their domains from the Sunnī Ottoman empire and to create a sense of unity amongst their subjects. It also enabled the Safavids to exist as a separate entity resisting, thereby, absorption into the Ottoman empire. Cited in R. Savory, *Studies on the History of Ṣafavid Iran* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1987), sec. III, 84; XII, 20.

[27] H. Rumlu, *Ahsan Tavarīkh* (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1350/1931), 61. See also A. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), 264; Savory, *Studies*, 64.

[28] Rumlu, *Ahsan*, 61.

[29] Rumlu, *Ahsan*, 61.

thereafter, popular practices related to Shīᶜīm were accepted by the masses even if they were not previously sanctioned by the jurists. Various other devices were used to enforce and propagate the now officially proclaimed Shīᶜīsm, among them public expression of grief during the first twelve days of *Muḥarram* to mark the martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson, Ḥusayn b. ᶜAlī (d. 61/680) at Kerbala.[30]

By Shāh Ṭahmāsp's time (931–84/1524–76), there were acts of self mortification and canonical cursing (*laᶜn*) of the first three caliphs on a massive scale.[31] In fact, in 917 A.H. the Shīᶜī jurist ᶜAlī b. Ḥusayn al-Karakī (d. 937 or 940) wrote a tract on the incumbency of cursing the caliphs.[32] Another way to promulgate Shīᶜīsm was to encourage the visitation of the shrines of the imams or their descendants (*imām-zādeh*).[33] One more example was the pronunciation of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, which was thus clearly one means of popularizing Shīᶜīsm amongst the laity. Gradually, these public rituals became the focus of socio-religious life in Persia and became deeply embedded in the minds of the masses.

The imposition of Shīᶜīsm on a predominantly Sunnī community was bound to meet with opposition, especially from the *ᶜulamāᵓ*. Many Sunnī *ᶜulamāᵓ* were put to death; many others fled to areas where Sunnīsm still prevailed.[34] They were replaced by Shīᶜī scholars who were imported into Safavid territory, mainly from Jabal ᶜĀmil. The attitude of these incoming Shīᶜī jurists towards public processions and dramas appears to have been dictated by pragmatism. As long as it did not directly contravene normative doctrine, popular culture was accepted. Tolerance towards acts of popular devotion was the price the *ᶜulamāᵓ* paid for mass conversion to Shīᶜīsm. In all probability, since the *wilāya* in the *adhān* did not contradict the sense of Shīᶜī doctrine and it enhanced the propagation of Shīᶜīsm at the popular level, the jurists did not feel the need to voice an objection to it. Moreover, as they had recently migrated to Iran and were largely patronized by the kings, the Shīᶜī *ᶜulamāᵓ* were hardly in a position to challenge the policies of the Safavid rulers.[35]

The Shīᶜī affiliations of the nascent state needed social expression. One way of fostering this was through the *adhān*. Henceforth, the role of the *adhān* was not to be confined to calling the faithful to prayer, but rather, it was to be used to avow the Shīᶜī identity of the Safavid state. Along with other measures undertaken by the state, the *adhān* was used to propagate Shīᶜīsm at a popular level. The *adhān* was also used for polemical purposes i.e., to remind the Shīᶜīs of their allegiance to ᶜAlī and his immediate succession to Muḥammad. Due to its popular appeal, Shīᶜī jurists refrained from denouncing the practice in public. By their silence the jurists in effect approved and accepted popular practice.[36]

A statement made by Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī I (d. 1070/1659), in his Persian commentary on al-Ṣadūq's *Man lā yaḥduruhu al-faqīh*, further indicates why the Shīᶜī jurists were now willing to allow the recitation of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* and thus reverse the rulings of earlier jurists. He states that in most parts of the country, the *wilāya* was recited in the *adhān*. When people omitted the *wilāya*, they were accused of being Sunnīs. Ironically, in this tract, Majlisī I invokes the doctrine of dissimulation (*taqiyya*—what I call inverse *taqiyya*) to recite the *wilāya*. Stated differently, *taqiyya* was used to assert rather than to hide Shīᶜī identity, that is, the *wilāya* was to be recited so as to avert accusations of being affiliated to the Sunnīs. Majlisī I goes on to cite the example

[30] Under Shāh ᶜAbbās I (1587–1629), the Muharram ceremonies, which had been limited to their devotional and folkloric aspects, became a great festival, both civil and religious. See Jean Calmard, "Shīᶜī Rituals and Power, II: The Consolidation of Safavid Shīᶜīsm: Folklore and Popular Religion," in *Safavid Persia*, ed. C. Melville (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 143.

[31] Calmard, "Shīᶜī Rituals," 143.

[32] Arjomand, *Shadow*, 165, citing Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Ḥusayn Khātūnābādī, *Vaqāyiᶜ al-sanīn va'l-aᶜvam* (Tehran: Islamiyya, 1352/1973).

[33] Arjomand, *Shadow*, 165.

[34] R. Savory, "Safavid Persia," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Holt, Lambton, and Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), 398; see also R. Savory, *Iran under the Safavids* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), 29.

[35] N. Keddie, "The Roots of the *ᶜUlamā*'s Power in Modern Iran," *Studia Islamica* 29 (1969): 42.

[36] The new polemical role envisaged for the *adhān* by the Safavids is further elucidated by a twentieth-century scholar, Aḥmad Zanjānī, in his "*Khayr al-umūr*." In it he narrates how Muᶜāwiya stirred the feelings of the masses by wearing the blood-stained shirt of ᶜUthmān and by commanding his governors to curse ᶜAlī from the pulpits. Zanjānī adds that when the Shīᶜīs came to power in Iran, the monarch—although he does not identify him, Zanjānī is undoubtedly referring to Shāh Ismāᶜīl—decided to mention the *wilāya* five times every day in order to repudiate the adversaries. He also declared that in the sermons, after the name of God and the Prophet, greetings and blessings be invoked on ᶜAlī and his infallible descendants. The *wilāya*, according to Zanjājnī, was a response to the curses invoked on ᶜAlī in Muᶜāwiya's time. However, this was not done with the intention of it being a part of the *adhān* but, rather, to embellish the *adhān* and to refute the arguments of the adversaries (Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 407).

of his own teacher, Mawlanā ^c^Abd Allāh, who, after much discussion, had decided to stop uttering the *wilāya* in the *adhān*. He adds that his teacher was accused of being a Sunnī. Majlisī then advised his teacher to recite the *wilāya*, to defend himself against accusations of having a Sunnī penchant. This was his practice for as long as he lived.[37]

The popular practice of reciting ^c^Alī's *wilāya* in the *adhān* was sanctioned in the Shī^c^ī juridical texts for the first time by Majlisī I in his *Rawḍa al-muttaqīn*. In fact, he explicitly allows and even justifies the practice. Commenting on al-Ṣadūq's statement, he states: "It is difficult to be certain that these traditions [on the *wilāya*] are due to their [the Mufawwiḍa's] fabrications." He further argues in favor of accepting rare *wilāya* traditions by claiming that this genre of traditions may be authentic but not well known. Moreover, he adds,

> just because the Mufawwiḍa or the Sunnīs perform an act does not mean that we can be certain that the truth lies in its contrary or that they [the traditions on the *wilāya*] have been fabricated unless there are [traditions transmitted] from them [the imams] which clearly indicate this. These have not been transmitted [from them]. Moreover, the Shī^c^īs used to perform it in the olden times and still do so. It is also clear that if one were to act upon it [pronouncing the *wilāya*] he would not be a sinner.[38]

Majlisī I was aware that his ruling on the issue was markedly different from the opinions expressed by the jurists. He vindicated this transformation by claiming: "It is possible it was forbidden before [this time] due to *taqiyya* [dissimulation], just as many *aḥādīth* [traditions] urge the omission of *ḥayya ^c^alā khayr al-^c^amal* [hasten to the best of deeds] from the *adhān* due to *taqiyya*." He further adds:

> It is not clear who al-Ṣadūq meant by the Mufawwiḍa; it seems that anyone who did not accept the *sahw* [acts of inadvertence] of the Prophet was a Mufawwiḍa,[39] or anyone who believed in inserting [anything] in the acts of worship [which are different] from those practiced by the Prophet is a Mufawwiḍa. On this basis, all Shī^c^īs, apart from al-Ṣadūq and his teacher, would be [classified as] Mufawwiḍa.[40]

A close study of *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh* indicates that Majlisī I's contention that al-Ṣadūq had possibly prohibited the *wilāya* due to *taqiyya* cannot be substantiated. As a matter of fact, just before he prohibits the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, al-Ṣadūq poses the question as to whether "*ḥayya ^c^alā khayr al-^c^amal*" can be omitted from the *adhān*. This, he states, can be done if one has to dissimulate.[41] Al-Ṣadūq clearly delineates parts of the *adhān* which can be omitted or altered when living under conditions of *taqiyya*. The fact that he unequivocally rules that the *wilāya* should not be mentioned at all in the *adhān* and ascribes this practice to the Mufawwiḍa suggests that *taqiyya* was not a factor in his ruling on the issue.

Majlisī I turns the argument on its head. First, he refutes the contention that the paucity of *wilāya* traditions implies they are not authentic. In essence, he refutes the views of jurists like Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, arguing that the fact that traditions about the *wilāya* are sparse does not imply that they are spurious. Having argued the possibility of their veracity, Majlisī I then claims that, according to both al-Ṣadūq and Ṭūsī, traditions allowing the pronouncement of the *wilāya* are available. For this reason, the *wilāya* can be recited, although not as a part of the *adhān*.

Despite Majlisī I's efforts at accommodating the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, his contemporaries did not concur with him. Thus al-Muḥaqqiq al-Sabzawārī (d. 1090/1679) states in *Dhakhīrat al-ma^c^ād*: "The jurists have clearly stated that it is an innovation (*bid^c^a*) and that inserting it in the *adhān* is dependent on *al-tawqīf al-shar^c^ī* [its divine ordainment], a fact which has not been established."[42] Fayḍ al-Kashānī (d. 1091/1680) maintains in his *Mafātīḥ al-sharā^ɔ^i^c^* that reciting the *wilāya* is an abominable (*makrūh*) act that is contrary to the *sunna*.[43] Vindicating the *wilāya* was clearly more difficult in the juridical texts than in popular practice.

Nevertheless, the argument for the recitation of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* was further enhanced by Muḥammad al-Bāqir (^c^Allāma) Majlisī (d. 1110/1698). Like his namesake, Majlisī II twists the discussion about the *wilāya* on its head. It is not impossible, he states, that the *wilāya* is among the *mustaḥabb* (recommended) parts of the *adhān*.

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37 As cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 388.

38 Cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 387.

39 On this see al-Ṣadūq, *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh*, 1: 234–35. See also the discussion in McDermott, *The Theology of Shaykh al-Mufīd* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1399/1978), 356. Al-Ṣadūq declares those who reject the *sahw* of the Prophet to be amongst the Mufawwiḍa.

40 Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 387.

41 al-Ṣadūq, *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh*, 1: 188.

42 Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 389.

43 That is, to the actions of the Prophet and his companions. See "sunna," in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 389.

This is because Ṭūsī, al-Ḥillī, Shahīd I, and others have testified that rare reports about it have been narrated. By quoting the opinions of preceding scholars, he declares that reports concerning it, although sparse, are available. The very point which al-Ṣadūq and Ṭūsī invoked to prohibit the *wilāya*—reports being rare—is used by Majlisī II, in fact, to permit it.[44]

To further vindicate the inclusion of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, Majlisī ingeniously divides segments of the *adhān* into obligatory and recommended parts. The *wilāya*, he declares, may be uttered as a recommended part of the *adhān*. By this neat bifurcation, he was able to undermine the objections of those arguing against inserting an extraneous element to an act of worship. He was thus also able finally to accommodate the *wilāya* as a component (albeit only a recommended one) of the *adhān*.[45]

ᶜAllāma Majlisī also introduces a new element into the discussion. Besides citing rational proofs to justify pronouncing the *wilāya*, as a recommended act, he adduces scriptural proof to sanction the practice, a point which was appropriated by most subsequent jurists. Majlisī II quotes a tradition cited in Ṭabarsī's *al-Iḥtijāj*. There Ṭabarsī narrates a tradition from al-Qāsim b. Muᶜāwiya, who is quoted as saying:

> I said to Abū ᶜAbd Allāh [Jaᶜfar al-Ṣādiq] that they [the Sunnīs] transmit a tradition in their [books on the] *miᶜrāj* [indicating] that when the Prophet was taken on the night ascension he saw writing on the throne which read: "There is no god but God, Muḥammad is the Prophet of God and Abū Bakr is the truthful one." Al-Ṣādiq is reported to have responded: "Glory be to God, they have altered everything, including this?" Al-Qāsim replied: "Yes." Al-Ṣādiq then reportedly said: "When God, the Almighty, most Glorious, created the throne, he wrote on it: "There is no god but God and Muḥammad is the Prophet of God and ᶜAlī is the Commander of the faithful."

This long tradition then ends with Jaᶜfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 147/765) telling al-Qāsim that "whenever one of you recites the *shahāda*, he should also say "ᶜAlī is the Commander of the faithful'."[46]

Since this tradition does not delineate the circumstances under which the *wilāya* is to be pronounced, it is interpreted by Majlisī II to be general, not restrictive in its applicability. Hence the *wilāya* in the *adhān* is construed by him to be subsumed under and even justified by this tradition. Majlisī adds that, if anyone utters the *wilāya* in order to attain *baraka* (blessings) without intending it to be a part of the *adhān*, then he is not a sinner, for the community has allowed any form of speech during the *adhān* and *iqāma*. This, Majlisī adds, is the best supplication and *dhikr* (recollection).[47] Thus what was considered to be *bidᶜa* by the preceding jurists becomes, for Majlisī II and most subsequent Shīᶜī jurists, a *sunna*. But Majlisī II needed scriptural support for his ruling on the *adhān*. This was provided by Jaᶜfar al-Ṣādiq's *ḥadīth* as found in *al-Iḥtijāj*.

The tradition, which is evidently polemical in nature, is transmitted to refute a Sunnī claim about the *miᶜrāj*. Rather than dealing with the question of the *wilāya* in the *adhān*, it purports to repudiate a Sunnī claim by offering a Shīᶜī version of the same event. That Ṭabarsī's tradition is not germane to the *wilāya* in the *adhān* can be discerned from the fact that, although it was reported by Ṭabarsī in the sixth century (four hundred years before Majlisī II), Shīᶜī scholars prior to Majlisī II did not consider that it provided sufficient proof to permit the recitation of the *wilāya*. In fact, no proponent of the *wilāya* before Majlisī II even referred to it in discussing the *wilāya*. Thus, despite Majlisī's reference to Ṭabarsī's tradition, the fact remains that it did not occur to previous jurists to refer to it, since it did not evidently point to the *wilāya* in the *adhān*.

Moreover, the tradition was not reported by any scholar before Ṭabarsī. As a matter of fact, the latter author does not cite the source of this tradition. Most of the traditions cited in *al-Iḥtijāj* are *mursal*, i.e., they do not have any *isnād* (chain of transmission) appended. In the introduction to his work, Ṭabarsī claims that he did not append chains of transmissions, either because there existed an *ijmāᶜ* (consensus) in reference to narrating most traditions reported in his book, or because the traditions in it agree with reasoning, or because they were well known.[48] However, the tradition of al-Qāsim b. Muᶜāwiya was certainly not known to the likes of al-Ṣadūq or Ṭūsī or scholars before Ṭabarsī since none of them had cited it. Moreover, even though most Shīᶜī *ḥadīth* scholars are

44 Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār al-jāmiᶜa li-ḍurari akhbār al-aᵓimma al-aṭhār*, 110 vols. (Beirut: Ihya' Turath al-Arabi, 1403/1982), 84: 111.

45 On the distinction between essential and recommended parts of an act, see Muḥammad b. Mulla Ibrāhīm al-Muẓaffar, *Shahāda al-thālitha dar adhān va iqāme* (Qum: Chap Nur, 1978), 2–3.

46 Aḥmad b. ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib Ṭabarsī, *al-Iḥtijāj* (Mashad: Saᶜid, 1403/1982), 158.

47 Majlisī, *Biḥār*, 84: 111–12.

48 Ṭabarsī, *al-Iḥtijāj*, 14. See also Agha Buzūrg Tihrānī, *al-Dharīᶜa ilā taṣānīf al-shīᶜa*, 29 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Adwa', 1403/1983), 1: 281.

agreed that *mursal* traditions cannot be considered probative, this tradition has been continuously quoted by subsequent Shīʿī scholars in supporting their own ruling on the *wilāya*.[49] A slight digression is necessary to show how traditions whose authenticity is not established in the sources can be used to rule that acts such as uttering the *wilāya* can be recommended.

THE PRINCIPLE OF LENIENCY IN DEDUCING PROOFS FOR RECOMMENDED ACTS

Based on principles established in *uṣūl al-fiqh*,[50] Shīʿī jurists often relax the stringent criteria set for accepting traditions in matters pertaining to recommended or abominable acts. Due to the relatively lax conditions involved, this principle is called *qāʾida al-tasāmuḥ fī adilla al-sunan*. Based on it, jurists have ruled that, in matters pertaining to recommended practices, even if the reliability of a *ḥadīth* cannot be fully ascertained, it may be acted on with the hope that the act will be accepted (*rajāʾ al-maṭlūbiyya*) and one will be rewarded for it even if, in reality, the tradition is not authentic. Various traditions are cited to vindicate this principle. In one such tradition, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq is reported to have told his disciple Hishām b. Sālim al-Jawālīqī (fl. second century):

> Whoever has received (*man balaghahu*) a [report] from the Prophet, peace be upon him, about the merits of [performing] an act and he acts according to that report, he will be rewarded for it even if the Prophet, peace be upon him, did not state it.[51]

Due to the prefix "whoever has received," this genre of traditions is called *man balaghahu*. In essence, the principle indicates that, in contrast to obligatory acts, a jurist does not need indubitable proofs to rule in favor of performing a recommended act. However, no jurist can rule that the performance of an act is incumbent, based on these kinds of traditions.[52]

By appealing to the rare *wilāya* traditions alluded to by al-Ṣadūq and Ṭūsī and the principle of *al-tasāmuḥ*, most post-Safavid jurists ruled that the *wilāya* can be considered a recommended part of the *adhān*. Thus the faithful are assured of reward for reciting the *wilāya* in the *adhān* even if, in reality, the imams have not actually uttered such traditions.[53] However, as al-Muẓaffar points out, even those jurists who mentioned the *wilāya* traditions about the *adhān* also claimed that these have been fabricated. *Man balaghahu* traditions, argues al-Muẓaffar, do not cover reports known to be fabricated. Thus it is known that the imams did not, in fact, state what is claimed by the report. Only those traditions that might have been uttered by the imams are subsumed under the principle of *al-tasāmuḥ*.[54]

Jurists like Majlisī and those after him were searching for ways to have the *wilāya* inserted in the *adhān*. Thus, although it does not have an *isnād* (chain of transmission) appended, they seized on Ṭabarsī's tradition and, invoking the *tasāmuḥ* principle, ruled that the *wilāya* can be considered to be a recommended part of the *adhān*. Therefore, if the *wilāya* could not be deemed to be an essential part, it could, because of Ṭabarsī's tradition and the principle of *al-tasāmuḥ*, be reckoned to be among the recommended parts of the *adhān*. The post-Majlisī II era shows a clear evolution in the thinking of the Shīʿī *fuqahāʾ* on the issue. Whereas Shīʿī jurists before him were generally agreed on not reciting the *wilāya*, jurists after him were generally agreed (with few exceptions) on its pronouncement. Subsequent *fiqh* works evinced even more arguments to vindicate its insertion in the *adhān*.

Most scholars after Majlisī II followed his line of argument and quote al-Ṣādiq's tradition as cited by Ṭabarsī. For example, in his *Mafātīḥ al-fayḍ*, al-Wahīd al-Bahbahānī (d. 1205/1790) states that to pronounce the *wilāya* with the intention of it being a part of the *adhān* is forbidden, as this is *bidʿa*. However, to recite it for the sake of receiving blessings is allowed. Just as, after stating "God is great" in the *adhān*, many people state: "the most lofty, sublime" (*jalla jalālah*) and cite other praises of God, and after bearing testimony to Muḥammad's

[49] See Muḥsinī A., *Buḥūth fī ʿilm al-rijāl* (Qum: 1404/1983), 136; Shahīd II, *Sharḥ al-bidāya fī ʿilm al-dirāya* (Tehran: Maktab Chehl Sutun, 1402/1982), 140. There are certain conditions when *mursal aḥādith* are acceptable. See the discussion in Shahīd II, *Sharḥ al-bidāya*, 141.

[50] Besides establishing principles for extrapolating juridical rulings, *uṣūl al-fiqh* also establishes the theory of juristic practice to deduce additional laws that cannot be directly derived from the revealed sources.

[51] See Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, *Wasāʾil al-shīʿa ilā taḥṣīl masāʾil al-sharīʿa*, 4th ed., 20 vols. (Beirut: Ihya' Turath al-Arabi, 1391/1971), 1: 60, quoting al-Barqī's *Kitāb al-maḥāsin*. For other traditions on this, see also al-Muẓaffar, *Shahāda*, 9.

[52] See Muḥammad al-Bāqir al-Ṣadr, *Durūs fī ʿilm al-uṣūl*, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dar Kitab al-Lubnani, 1399/1978), 2: 204, 3: 258 [part 1], for details of this principle.

[53] al-Muẓaffar, *Shahāda*, 11.

[54] al-Muẓaffar, *Shahāda*, 12.

prophecy, it is recommended to invoke God's blessings on the Prophet (although these are not part of the *adhān*), similarly, it is recommended that the *wilāya* be recited after the *shahāda,* based on the *ḥadīth* cited in *al-Iḥtijāj* and other general traditions. Bahbahānī asks poignantly: "Is there an obstacle to ruling that this be a recommended act? The fact that a report is rare does not mean it cannot be practiced as a *mustaḥabb* (recommended) act." As a matter of fact, Bahbahānī adds, this was Ṭūsī's normal practice. Whenever he comes across a rare report, he recommends that it be acted upon. For example, Ṭūsī rules, based on a report from Ibn Yaqīn, that it is recommended to repeat a prayer if one forgets to recite the *adhān* and *iqāma* at the beginning.[55] In any case, he adds, to speak during the *adhān* and *iqāma* is permissible. If futile speech does not invalidate the *adhān*, then what about an auspicious act (*tayammun*) which bestows blessings?[56]

PRE-MODERN AND MODERN PERIODS

Most of the Qājar rulers (1209–1344/1794–1925) in Iran were committed to upholding Shīᶜīsm as the state religion, reversing thereby the anti-religious policies of Nādir Shāh (d. 1160/1747). Aqā Muḥammad Khān (d. 1212/1797), the first Qājar king, reaffirmed this commitment when he was crowned Shāh in 1210/1796. His pious nephew Fatḥ ᶜAlī Shāh (d. 1250/1834) continued his religious policies by building mosques and commissioning the composition of Shīᶜī theological works. He also built the Fayḍiya theological college in Qum[57] and took special pains to show respect to the *ᶜulamāᵓ*.[58] Under these favorable conditions, the religious centers and Shīᶜī *ᶜulamāᵓ* flourished.

Shīᶜī jurists living under the Qājar rulers thus continued to use the *adhān* to assert their religious affiliations. Most jurists of the epoch concurred with the rulings of post-Safavid jurists. Jaᶜfar b. Khiḍr al-Najafī Kāshif al-Ghiṭāᵓ (d. 1228/1813), for example, maintained that, if one remembers the Commander of the faithful with the intention of exhibiting his status, manifesting his preponderance, or to refute the views of the opponents and defy the obstinate ones, then he will be rewarded for it.[59] Given the favorable ambiance in which the Shīᶜīs now found themselves, the *wilāya* in the *adhān* was used as a polemical weapon to demonstrate the preponderance of the Shīᶜī faith. For Kāshif al-Ghiṭāᵓ, the polemical function that the *wilāya* performed could outweigh the objections of the likes of al-Ṣadūq and Ṭūsī. As a matter of fact, Kāshif al-Ghiṭāᵓ further declares that mentioning the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī in the *adhān* is not sufficient to indicate ᶜAlī's preponderance because the term *wilāya* has diverse meanings and could be used in different ways. Moreover, all believers are friends (*awliyāᵓ*) of God. In order to differentiate ᶜAlī from and elevate him above all other friends of God, he says, it is better to state that ᶜAlī is the *khalīfa bilā faṣl* (the successor to Muḥammad without any interruption), or the Commander of the faithful, or the best of creation after the Prophet. Moreover, he adds, by doing this, there will be no doubt in the minds of the masses that this statement is not a part of the *adhān*. For Kāshif al-Ghiṭāᵓ, the *wilāya* in the *adhān* was not a mere declaration of faith or statement of a cardinal doctrine. It was to be used as a badge of identity to show the superiority of ᶜAlī over the other caliphs and to assert his immediate succession to Muḥammad.

Al-Faḍīl al-Narāqī (d. 1244/1828) claims that *tawallī* (the view that the segments must follow each other in sequence without interruption) is not a stipulation of the *adhān* or the *iqāma*. Neither is it specified that the segments of the *adhān* should not be separated. So pronouncing the *wilāya* does not contravene the conditions of the *adhān*. He asks poignantly: how can one be permitted to utter futile words during the *adhān* and yet not be allowed to state the truth? The fact that reports concerning the *wilāya* are rare, al-Narāqī adds, is not an impediment in ruling that the *wilāya* is a *sunna*. This is so because jurists often accept rare reports and rule that it is recommended to undertake an act based on these kinds of narrations based on the principle of *al-tasāmuḥ*.[60] The jurists foresaw, however, a possible danger that lay ahead for the Shīᶜī laity, i.e., that through continuous practice, the *wilāya* could appear to many to be an integral part of the *adhān*. Despite a continuous reminder that the *wilāya* was not a part of the *adhān*, any caller to prayer could recite it without being aware of this distinction. The Shīᶜī jurists countered this by disclaiming their own responsibility. Jurists like al-Faḍīl al-Narāqī stated that the fault lay with the ignorant masses who, despite several reminders, were not aware of the ruling on the issue. Others recommended that the *wilāya* be recited in a different manner so that it would become apparent that it was not a part of the *adhān*. Al-Muḥaqqiq al-Qummī (d. 1231/1815), for example,

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[55] See Muḥammad b. Jaᶜfar Ṭūsī, *Tahdhīb al-aḥkām fī sharḥ al-Muqniᶜa*, 10 vols. (Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, 1365/1945), 2: 279. The fact that Ṭūsī contravenes his normal practice (i.e., he does not recommend the recitation of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* based on rare reports) suggests that he did not find the reports on it to be reliable. This is not pointed out by Bahbahānī.

[56] As cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 392.

[57] Arjomand, *Shadow*, 218.

[58] A. Lambton, *Qājar Persia* (London: Tauris, 1987), 286.

[59] Cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 394.

[60] Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 396.

states in his *Jāmi^c^ al-shitāt* that it ought to be recited only once in the *adhān* and that it be totally omitted from the *iqāma*.[61] However, for the Shī^c^ī laity, the *wilāya* had become an integral segment of the *adhān*. Few, if any, distinguish it from other parts of the *adhān*.

Post-Majlisī II jurists had to vindicate not only the popular practice of reciting the *wilāya* but they also had to deal with the vexing problem of explicating the prohibition by earlier jurists. In his *Burhān al-fiqh*, Sayyid ^c^Alī Baḥr al-^c^Ulūm (d. 1298/1880) maintains that the verdict of al-Ṣadūq, Ṭūsī, and other jurists is a product of their own personal reasoning (*ijtihād*). The fact that there are general traditions (like the one cited in *al-Iḥtijāj*) obviates the need for a report specifically recommending the *wilāya*; that is, even though there are no specific reports regarding the *wilāya*, Ṭabarsī's general tradition is enough to rule that it is a recommended practice. Just as there are reports suggesting that whenever the name of the Prophet is mentioned, it is recommended to send blessings on him, similarly Ṭabarsī's tradition indicates that whenever the *shahāda* is recited, it is recommended to recite the *wilāya*. The *adhān* and the *iqāma*, says Baḥr al-^c^Ulūm, both fall under this category.[62]

Despite the emerging consensus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the *wilāya* be recited as a part of the *adhān*, dissenting views were also expressed. Even in the middle of the nineteenth century, many Shī^c^īs refused to recite it. Thus, the aforementioned Ja^c^far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā^ɔ^ had initially asked Fatḥ ^c^Alī Shāh to ban the innvation.[63] Later in that century, the *^c^ulamā^ɔ^* of India encouraged the community to abandon the practice but it failed to do so.[64] Similarly Maḥmūd b. Mirza ^c^Alī al-Naqī (d. 1300/1882), the author of *al-Mawāhib al-sanniyya*, refutes the arguments of Majlisī II and other Shī^c^ī jurists. He declares that due to lack of evidence, the *wilāya* cannot be recited even as a recommended segment of the *adhān*. The tradition in *al-Iḥtijāj* cannot be used as proof for permitting the *wilāya* since it, like many other traditions, merely mentions the excellencies of ^c^Alī, indicating thereby his general virtues. The tradition in *al-Iḥtijāj*, like other traditions about the merits of ^c^Alī, merely indicates the superiority of ^c^Alī, and is not linked to the *adhān* or the *iqāma*.

Mirza ^c^Alī al-Naqī adds that, as for the *wilāya* traditions referred to by erstwhile scholars, they are not to be acted upon because the scholars considered them to be rare and fabricated. He admits that previous Shī^c^ī jurists had maintained that rare and weak reports could be used for ruling in favor of undertaking recommended acts. But the fact that they did not do so in this case shows that they had concurred on abandoning their normal practice in regard to this issue. In essence, Mirza ^c^Alī al-Naqī rejected the verdict of later scholars like Majlisī II that the *wilāya* can be recited as a recommended part of the *adhān*.[65]

Once the *wilāya* was generally accepted, however, reversing the trend was bound to be difficult. Subsequent discussion focused on the basis on which it could be recited and on whether or not it was a recommended part of the *adhān*. Most jurists approved the practice by quoting the arguments of Majlisī I and II and the tradition of al-Ṣādiq cited in *al-Iḥtijāj*.

It is important to note that just as the pre-Safavid jurists agreed on prohibiting the *wilāya*, post-Safavid *fuqahā^ɔ^* concurred in permitting it. Thus the agreement of most later jurists was in stark contrast to the consensus of their predecessors. The arguments advanced by the likes of Majlisī I and II had the effect of convincing subsequent jurists that the *wilāya* could be recited, although not as an integral part of the *adhān*. The pressure of popular practice and the distinct possibility of adverse public reaction forced the jurists to accommodate the *wilāya*, reversing, thereby, the consensus of erstwhile scholars.

Most Shī^c^ī jurists of the present century have also ruled that it is recommended to recite the *wilāya*. The late Ayatullāh Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm (d. 1390/1970) goes further in his *al-Mustamsak* stating:

> . . . in this era it [the *wilāya*] is counted amongst the symbols of [true] faith and a sign of Shī^c^īsm. In this regard, it [reciting the *wilāya*] becomes preponderant according to the *sharī^c^a*; in fact, it could be obligatory [to recite it] but not with the intention of being a part of the *adhān*. From this, the reason stated in [Majlisī II's] *al-Biḥār* becomes clear, i.e., it is not improbable for the attestation of the *wilāya* to be counted as a recommended part of the *adhān*. This is due to the testimony of the Shaykh [Ṭūsī], ^c^Allāma [al-Ḥillī], Shahīd I, and others that traditions have been reported to this effect. This is further supported by the tradition [reported] by al-Qāsim b. Mu^c^āwiya cited in *al-Iḥtijjāj* of Ṭabarsī from al-Ṣādiq. . . .[66]

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[61] Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 394.

[62] Cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 399.

[63] Modarressi, *Crisis*, 44, n. 140, quoting Akhbārī, *Risālat dar shahādat bar wilāyat*, 181–83. As noted above, he later accepted the practice.

[64] Muḥsin Amīn, *A^c^yān al-Shī^c^a*, 11 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Ta^c^aruf, 1951), 2: 205.

[65] As cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 400.

[66] Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm, *Mustamsak al-^c^urwa al-wuthqā* (Qum: Maktaba al-Mārashi al-Najafi, 1969), 5: 545.

Al-Ḥakīm argues that the purpose of reciting the *wilāya* was not restricted to attaining rewards or blessings. The *wilāya* symbolized Shīᶜī ideals, identity, and aspirations. Thus depending on the circumstances, reciting the *wilāya* could even be made incumbent on the faithful even though, as he cautions, it should not be recited as a part of the *adhān*. Significantly, when referring to the *wilāya* as a Shīᶜī symbol, al-Ḥakīm links it to Majlisī II's statement, thus corroborating my earlier contention that the Safavid era marks the time when the *adhān* began to assume a polemical tenor, serving as a means of defiance and a badge of identity for Shīᶜīs living now under the patronage of the Safavid rulers.

Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mūsawī (d. 1377/1957) also disagrees with his predecessors stating that

> those who declared the *wilāya* prohibited have erred and cited an isolated ruling (*shadhdha*). They [even] said it was an innovation (*bidᶜa*). Every *muᵓadhdhin* [reciter of the *adhān*] in Islam recites a few words before the *adhān* which he connects with it. Like in his saying: "Praise be to God who did not take a son . . . " or other [words] like these. . . . These have not been legislated by the Lawgiver (*Shāriᶜ*) in the *adhān* yet they are not considered to be innovations, neither is it certainly prohibited to do so, because the callers to prayer do not see them as being parts of the *adhān*. They merely recite them based on general proofs which include these [words]. Similarly, the attestation to ᶜAlī's *wilāya* after the two *shahāda* in the *adhān* is an act based on general proofs which allow it. Moreover, a few words do not invalidate the *adhān* or the *iqāma*; neither is it prohibited (*ḥarām*) to recite them in their midst, so where did [the question of] innovation and prohibition come from . . . ?[67]

Post-Safavid jurists had to explain the prohibition of the erstwhile jurists, justifying, in the process, the transformation from *bidᶜa* to *sunna*. They did this by various means. Whereas Majlisī I claimed that they had prohibited the *wilāya* due to *taqiyya*, Baḥr al-ᶜUlūm insisted that it was due to the personal reasoning of the earlier jurists. Hence it was not binding on later jurists. Despite the consensus reached by pre-Safavid jurists, Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mūsawī could still claim that their ruling on the *wilāya* was an isolated one.

Ayatullāh Arākī (d. 1415/1994) states in a treatise entitled "Guidance in matter of the *shahāda* of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* and *iqāma* being a part of them like other parts":

> The author of *Kitāb al-salafa fī amr al-khilāfa*, Shaykh ᶜAbd Allāh al-Marāghī al-Misrī, a Sunnī, says that Salmān al-Fārisī attested to the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī in them [*adhān* and *iqāma*] after attesting to the prophecy during the time of the Prophet. A man entered [to see] the Prophet of God and said: "O Prophet of God, I have heard a thing which I have not heard before." He [the Prophet] said: "And what is this?" He said: "After the *shahāda* [testimony] to the *risāla* [prophecy], Salmān bore witness in his *adhān* a *shahāda* to the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī." He replied: "You have heard a good thing."[68]

Thereafter, it is also claimed the eminent companion Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī also bore testimony to the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī following the testimony to the prophecy of Muḥammad in the *adhān*.

A new argument is now added to the debate, i.e., this was practiced at the time of the Prophet, who did not object to it. The Prophet's approbation makes this practice a *sunna*. Ironically, it is from a Sunnī source that a tradition on the *wilāya* in the *adhān* is purportedly cited. It is to be noted that prior to this time, although many arguments in favor of the *wilāya* in the *adhān* were advanced, there was no mention of the *wilāya* of ᶜAlī being uttered in the *adhān* at the time of the Prophet or during the lives of any of the imams. Despite the citation of many traditions about the *adhān* in Shīᶜī juridical works, there is not a single tradition in them which indicates that the *wilāya* was recited in the *adhān* in the times of the Prophet or the imams.

Nonetheless, recent jurists such as Burūjardī (d. 1381/1961), Khumaynī (d. 1410/1989), al-Khūᵓī (d. 1413/1992) and Golpayganī (d. 1414/1993) all consider the *wilāya* to be a recommended act in the *adhān*.[69]

CONCLUSION

Through different lines of arguments, a ritual practice that was previously considered to be *bidᶜa* later became a *sunna*. The reason for this change appears to lie in the need to establish a distinct Shīᶜī identity in Safavid Iran. With the establishment of that dynasty, there was a concurrent need to foster a separate sectarian identity through

[67] Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mūsawī, *al-Naṣṣ wa'l-ijtihād* (Qum: Sayyid al-Shuhada', 1404/1983), 243–44.

[68] Cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 405. See also al-Muẓaffar, *Shahāda*, 35, quoting *Jawāhir al-wilāya*, 349.

[69] As cited in Ustādī, *Kalimāt*, 405–6.

which the Shī^cīs could be distinguished from non-Shī^cīs, and thus the *wilāya* was to be intertwined with the *shahāda*. Various arguments were advanced and traditions interpreted inexorably to link the two. In fact, the *wilāya* is frequently referred to as the third *shahāda* (*al-shahāda al-thālitha*). Henceforth, the *adhān* was to perform a wider function than the hitherto restricted liturgical role of calling the faithful to prayer. It was to avow the religious affiliations of the state.

Paradoxically, what distinguished the Shī^cīs from the Mufawwiḍa at the time of al-Ṣadūq was reversed and was now used to distinguish the Shī^cīs from non-Shī^cīs. Stated differently, the distinctive mark of the Mufawwiḍa in al-Ṣadūq's time became, for Majlisī I and subsequent *fuqahā*^ɔ, a distinctive emblem of the Shī^cīs. This was done initially by interpreting a tradition cited in Ṭabarsī's *al-Iḥtijāj*—a tradition which was certainly unknown to the likes of Ṭūsī and al-Ṣadūq. No Shī^cī scholar earlier than Ṭabarsī had cited this report. Furthermore, al-Ṣadūq's and Ṭūsī's remark that rare (and purportedly unauthentic) reports have been narrated about the *wilāya* were seized upon by the likes of Majlisī I and II to indicate that traditions on the subject were available from the imams, traditions which, although rare and no longer extant, could be used to vindicate the practice. Later on, it was even argued that the practice could be traced to the time of Muḥammad himself who, by his acquiescence, had approved of it.